Nuclear Cost Overruns

Georgia's Vogtle Units 3 and 4 were estimated at $14 billion in 2009. They entered service in 2023-2024 at $35 billion, 7 years late. This is not an outlier. Every recent Western nuclear project has blown its budget by 2-5x. The pattern is consistent enough to require explanation.

Five reinforcing factors drive nuclear cost overruns. First-of-a-kind engineering: after a 30-year construction gap, the workforce, supply chain, and regulatory muscle memory for building reactors atrophied. Each project rediscovers problems that a continuous build program would have solved. Second, custom designs: unlike standardized gas turbines ordered from a catalog, each nuclear plant involves extensive site-specific engineering. Third, regulatory ratcheting: safety requirements increase mid-construction, requiring redesigns. Fourth, construction complexity: nuclear-grade concrete and welding standards demand extraordinary quality control, and rework rates are high. Fifth, financing cost: at 10-12 year construction timelines, interest accumulates on billions of borrowed capital before a single kilowatt-hour is sold.

Quantify the financing burden. $14 billion borrowed at 8% for 12 years of construction accumulates roughly $6-8 billion in interest alone, before any cost overrun.

Why do South Korea and China build reactors on budget while the US and Europe cannot?

Standardization and continuity. South Korea built identical APR-1400 designs in sequence, maintaining workforce expertise. China has 20+ reactors under construction simultaneously. Continuous construction preserves institutional knowledge. Western projects are one-offs separated by decades.

Nuclear's cost problem is institutional, not physical. The technology works. The project delivery system does not.

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